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Tinbergen Institute Complexity in Economics Seminars – Equal responsibility in the queueing problem.

Tinbergen Instituut

In the reordering problem, this paper investigates the implications of invariance of relative position, which requires that, for any two problems with the same vector of unit waiting costs, each agent who holds the same relative position with others in the initial queues of these two problems should receive the same net utility in both. We show that the family of all pairwise gain-spliting rules is the maximal set of rules satisfying queue-efficiency, budget balance, individual rationality from an efficient initial queue and Pareto indifference, together with invariance of relative position. Moreover, by replacing individual rationality from an efficient initial queue with individual rationality and imposing independence of smaller costs (respectively, independence of larger costs), we characterize the maximum price rule (respectively, the minimum price rule).

Sprekers

  • Youngsub Chun (Seoul National University)

Locatie

Tinbergen Institute, room 1.01, Gustav Mahlerplein 117,
1082 MS Amsterdam